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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The division of property belonging to the 
parties was proper inasmuch as the trial court must con-
sider each case on its own facts, and achieve equity, may 
exercise wide latitude in awarding relief as it deems 
just and proper. 
2. The court below properly awarded the Appellant 
the value of his labors consistent with evidence presented 
at trial. The conduct and testimony of the parties demon-
strates that no gift was intended and that each party con-
sidered himself owner of his separate property. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a divorce action where the sole issue is 
the equitable distribution of property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the court Judge Robert F. 
Owens, District Judge pro tern and a Circuit Judge of the 
State of Utah Presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
That Defendant-Appellant, William LeRoy Jesperson, 1 
Sr. be denied any modification whatsoever of the division o: 
property made by the court below consistent with the evidencl 
1 
presented to the lower court and the points presented in 
this response to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Respondent and the Defendant-Appella: 
were married to each other on March 20, 1973 in Roswell, Ne· •. · 
Mexico, and no children were born as issue to the marriage 
(Tr. Pl4, LL12-18). Plaintiff is now 74 years old and Defen· 
dant is now 79 years old. (Full Disclosure Financial 
Declarations). 
At the time of the marriage the Defendant-Appella"'. 
had no assets having been unemployed for some five years 
prior thereto with monthly social security as his sole sourc: 
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did own property consisting of an automobile, furniture, 
$12,500.00 in certificates of deposit, $10,000.00 in sav-
ings, (Tr. P38, LL4-9), and a mobile home which had been 
recently purchased for $17,500. (Tr. P38, LL4-9). 
On March 1, 1979 a trial was held pursuant to the 
Plaintiff-Respondent's action for divorce at which time the 
court distributed the property of the marriage 77% to the 
Plaintiff and 23% to the Defendant. (FINDINGS P.2, March 2, 
1979). The court also made the following findings: 
1. Although the mobile home in issue is held in 
joint tenancy, there was no intention by Plaintiff to create 
a one-half property interest in Defendant, nor any expect-
ation by Defendant that he had received a one-half property 
interest. 
2. Defendant was guilty of repeated marital mis-
conduct which not only constitutes grounds for divorce, but 
which should be considered in making an equitable division 
of property. 
3. The purchase price of the mobile home and lot 
in issue was $19,027.00 which was all contributed from 
Plaintiff's separate funds, and which she is entitled to 
recover from the $27,000.00 sales price, leaving a balance 
of $7,973.00 to be disposed of. (FINDINGS, Pl, March 2, 1979) 
The Plaintiff-Respondent does not agree with and 
-3-
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takes exception to the Defendant-Appellant's statement of 
facts inconsistent with the statement herein contained for 
the reason that the Defendant-Appellant's statement of 
facts is in essence argument and not a concise statement of 
the facts as required by Rule 75 (p) (2) (2) (d). 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The division of property belonging to the parties 
was proper inasmuch as the trial court must con-
sider each case on its own facts, and to achieve 
equity, may exercise wide latitude as it deems 
just and proper. 
In testimony presented at trial it was established 
that the marriage of the parties was perilously "on the rocks" 
almost from its very beginning. Some three weeks subsequent 
to the marriage ceremony the Defendant-Appellant abandoned 
his new wife while they were on vacation in Phoenix, Arizona 
(they were residing in Ruidoso, New Mexico at the time) 
leaving only a note stating that he was going to go away with 
Edith, another woman. (Tr. Pl4, LL24, 25, Tr. Pl5, LLl-20). 
This first extended absence lasted for a period of Twenty-one 
days (Tr. Pl5, LL20-23). In the five years that followed, 
the Defendant-Appellant made excursions to distant parts of 
the country from Florida (Tr. Pl5, LL12-15) to California 
(Tr. P33 LLll-12) on eleven different occassions, some lasting 
as long as three months (Tr. P29, LL14-23). In total, the 
Defendant-Appellant was absent from his wife over three hund-
red days. (Tr. Pl4, LL3-9). 
As presented in the statement of facts, the Plaintiff-
Respondent came into the marriage with at least $22,500.00 in 
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savings and certificates of deposit (Tr. P39, LL19-2S), 
a home and an automobile fully paid for (Tr. P40, LL7-ll) 
The Defendant-Appellant, on the other hand, 
into the marriage with nothing more than the right to re-
ceive a social security check in an amount of less th~ 
$240. 00 (Tr. Pl98, 116, 7), an old suitcase with a rope ti~c 
around it, and a duff le bag containing a few old clothes. 
(Tr. P41, 1112-25, P42, 111-24). 
At the end of the marriage, Plaintiff-Respondent': 
savings and certificates of deposit had been completely de-
pleted, a large portion thereof having been spent on keepir.; 
the household and providing the expenses of improvement of 
the same (Tr. P62, 119-25), sending money to the Defendant-
Appellant at his request in exchange for his continual 
promises to return from his visits to other women, and giv-
ing the Defendant-Appellant money at his request to sustain 
his expensive gambling habit in Las yegas (Tr .. P60, L19-25, 
Tr. P51, 111-25, Tr. P74, 114-23). The only items of prop-
erty remaining were the mobile home, the furniture therein 
and the automobile, all of which had also been purchased 
with Plaintiff-Respondent's separate funds (Tr. P38, 114·9, 
1120-25). In essence, the Plaintiff-Respondent entered 
this marriage well situated, with enough income to take 
care of herself likely for the remainder of her life. Ho1.· 
-6-
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ever in a few short years she went out of the marriage having 
lost a substantial portion of her assets, and the Defendant-
Appellant having received substantial benefits therefrom. 
The Defendant-Appellant then comes before the court, contests 
the property distribution, and attempts to gain one-half of 
the rest of the Plaintiff-Respondent's assets as a result of 
his having helped around the yard on the three homes in which 
the couple lived. 
The lower court, after hearing the evidence, found 
no basis for assisting the Defendant-Appellant in his further 
usurpation of the Plaintiff-Respondent's property, but rend-
ered a just and equitable award consistent with the facts of 
the case. 
The lower court's consideration of the Defendant-
Appellant's repeated marital misconduct in making an equitable 
division of the property was consistent with the rule first 
enunciated in Wilson v. Wilson 5 Utah 2nd 79,_ 296 P. 2d 977 
(1956): 
"In regard to the defendant's contention that the 
judgment represents an effort of the court to 
impose a punishment upon him: We recognize that 
there is no authority in our law for administering 
punitive measures in a divorce judgment, and that 
to do so would be improper, except that the court 
may, and as a practical matter invariably does, 
consider the relative lo alt or dislo alt of the 
parties to t eir marriage vows, an t eir re ative 
uilt or innocence in causin the breaku of the 
marriage. It is to be recognize that it is 
seldom, perhaps never, that there is any wholly 
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guilty or wholly innocent party to a divorce 
action. The trial court was aware, of course 
that when people are well adjusted and happy'. 
· f h d · in marriage, one o t em oes not Just out of a 
clear blue sky fall in love with someone else· 
and that when this occurs it is usually an ind. 
cation that the marriage has disintegrated fro 1 
other causes." (Emphasis ours) m 
From the facts presented at trial, the Defendanc-
Appellant' s disregard for the marriage vows was so flagrant 
that at one point he left the Plaintiff-Respondent for a 
period of three months, moved into an apartment with the 
girlfriend Edith only to return when he ran out of money 
(Tr. P29, LL3-25, P30, LLl-8). He stated at the trial the: 
his· reason for leaving the Plaintiff-Respondent only three 
weeks after their marriage was because of his adrnit'ted love 
for another woman (Tr. Pl58, LLl-8). 
The trial court in its findings did not state thi:· 
it was administering any punitive measures against the Defe:.c 
Appellant, but only that marital misconduct was taken into· 
sideration in making an equitable property se.ttlernent. Tha'. 
particular finding, taken together with other facts replete 
in the record such as; (a) that only the Plaintiff-Responc: 
brought substantial property into the marriage, property ac;: 
ulated and paid for prior to the Defendant-Appellant' 5 arri 
,, 
upon the scene; (b) that little or no property was accur:i•;. 
during the marriage with the 
real property which had been 
f t:' 
exception of appreciation ° 
bought and paid for by Plaine 
-8-
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Respondent; (c) that the ability of either party to earn 
money was limited, inasmuch as both parties were over the 
age of retirement; (d) that the financial condition of 
the Plaintiff-Respondent was secure whereas the Defendant-
Appellant had only Social Security as a source; (e) that 
the duration of the marriage was less than six years, no 
children having been born, and the Defendant-Appellant hav-
ing been absent a great deal of the time; (f) that the 
Plaintiff-Respondent, by way of this marriage had to give 
up her substantial security and share it with the Defendant-
Appellant through the duration of the marriage; (g) that 
the Defendant-Appellant exerted pressures upon the Plaintiff-
Respondent to provide for him and place some of her property 
in joint tenancy (Tr. Pll5, LL8-23) all lend support to the 
logic of the lower court's distribution of the property. 
In light of all the facts the trial court clearly 
followed the guidance provided in the recent _case of Read v. 
Read 594 P. 2d 871, Utah (1979) wherein it stated: 
"When a marriage has failed, a court's duty 
is to consider the various factors relating 
to the situation and to arrange the best 
possible allocation of the property and the 
economic resources of the parties so that 
parties and their children can pursue their 
lives in as happy and useful manner as possible." 
(emphasis ours) 
The trial court distributed the property 77% to the Plaintiff-
Respondent and 23% to the Defendant-Appellant. Each party 
-9-
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after the separation returned to live with a relative· h 
, t e 
Plaintiff-Respondent in Texas, and the Defendant-Appell ant 
in California. The Defendant-Appellant was at least, froc 
a financial standpoint, returned to a position where, as 
he admitted at trial, was no worse off than he was prior 
to the marriage. (Tr. P200, LL9-25). The Plaintiff-
Respondent however suffere4 irreparable financial loss as, 
result of the entanglement and was not, and apparently 
could not be, returned to her pre-marriage financial con-
dition. 
It would appear that the trial court was very 
cautious to properly apply the rule of Read v. Read Supra. 
However the court was apparently also aware that the same 
rule of law applied to a new set of facts may result in a 
different outcome. In Read the court dealt with the breaku~' 
of a twenty-five year marriage which included four children. 
(one still living at home), five automobiles •. a family 
business having been jointly managed by the parties for 
some eighteen years, and various other real and personal 
property possessions. The fruits of the marriage in ~ 
were apparently born out of many years of joint toil a~ 
effort. In the present case there were no children, only a 
short marriage, and the 
the facts of Read, the 
b · 1 deci· ded that absent court o vious y 
· encrd Defendant-Appellant had expen -
a "pursuit of his life in as happy and as useful manner 
-10-
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as possible" at the expense of the Plaintiff-Respondent for 
five years of marriage and that by this action he should 
not be permitted to continue such a course. 
The Defendant-Appellant presents the case of 
Martinett v. Martinett 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P2d 821 (1958), 
in support of its position. Once again, as in Read, Supra 
the fundamental rule is correct, that the trial court must 
consider the various factors relating to the situation and 
not abuse its discretion, however the facts of the case 
are entirely different. In Martinett the parties had as 
the opinion states; "spent substantially their adult lives 
together." They had raised two children and had accumulated 
significant property over the course of thirty-three years 
of marriage. The court found itself in the position of hav-
ing to untie the complicated knot of thirty-three years of 
property accumulation, contributions by the parties, and the 
degrees of reliance of one party upon anothe~ over the years. 
These facts are hardly similar to those of the case now be-
fore the court. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant strongly emphasizes that 
given the facts of the current case, and given the law of 
the above stated cases, the trial court would have been 
clearly abusing its discretion if it had attempted to treat 
the brief, uncertain, and loose arrangement between the 
-11-
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Parties in this case in the same fashion as the law require 
a marriage to be treated when being dissolved after long 
years of interwoven interests and untraceable accumulations 
of property. The trial court applied the proper law to the 
proper facts and in so doing was well within the bounds of 
the underlying test in this matter before the court, first 
laid down in Wilson Supra. and reiterated in Martinett as 
follows: 
''Nevertheless, it is firmly established in 
our law that the trial judge will be indulged 
considerable latitude and discretion in 
ad ·us tin the financial and ro ert interests 
of the parties; conversely however, i there 
is such serious inequity as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion, this court will 
make the modification necessary to bring 
about a just result." (emphasis ours) 
The Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully submits that a just 
result has been reached and that the trial court was proper 
exhibiting no serious inequity or abuse of discretion in 
making its award in this case. 
Point 2. The court below properly awarded the Defendant· 
Appellant the value of his labors consistent 
with evidence presented at trial. The conduct 
and testimony of the parties demonstrated that 
no gift was intended and that each party con-
sidered himself owner of his separate property. 
-12-
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The trial court did find and award the Defendant-
Appellant the reasonable value of his labors on the third 
home owned by the parties in the amount of $2,100.00 
(FINDINGS P. 1, March 2, 1979). There was extensive testi-
mony and cross-examination regarding improvements to the 
previous two homes. Although much thereof was conflicting, 
certain points were established that apparently caused the 
trial court to find the Defendant-Appellant's claims to be 
unpursuasive: 
1. The first home was bought and paid for by the 
Plaintiff-Respondent prior to the marriage of the parties. 
She made certain improvements including the enclosure of a 
carport and the back porch, paying for both lumber, other 
materials and labor (Tr. P43, LL15-25, P44, LLl-25). 
2. Improvements to the homes were testified to by 
both parties, however, Defendant-Appellant was unable to 
establish that he significantly contributed to the funding 
of the improvements inasmuch as his income was limited to 
social security (Tr. P202, LL21-23, P50, LL15-22). 
3. Plaintiff-Respondent funded all improvements 
to the homes (Tr. PSO, LL23, 24, P49, LL12-25, PSO, LLl-14). 
4. The Defendant-Appellant was in his mid to late 
seventies during the time and had not worked for at least 
-13-
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five years and as such did not offer any specialized skill: 
to the improvement of the yards of the three houses bey , one 
that which was contributed by the Plaintiff-Respondent 
(Tr. P201, LL4-25, LLl-6). 
5. The Plaintiff-Respondent assisted in the con-
struction of the improvements (Tr. P46, LL9-23) as well as 
maintained the household activity which the Defendant-
Appellant admitted was of equal importance to his labor 
(Tr. P209, LL15-25). 
6. The Defendant-Appellant was absent from the 
homes a large portion of the time (Tr. Pl4, LL7-ll). These 
points together with the demeanor of the parties at trial 
in the course of establishing their burdens of proof were 
the apparent basis for the trial court to hold contrary to 
the various theories and formulas now being placed before 
the court by the Defendant-Appellant. 
The Defendant-Appellant's computations are in 
error for two reasons: (1) they take into consideration 
facts concerning labor on the Ruidoso and Roswell homes tha: 
at trl. al, (2) the: were apparently unpursuasive and unproven 
fail to take into consideration the fact proven at trial 
that the improvements were funded by the Plaintiff Responoe· 
out of her own separate funds (see APPELLANT'S BRIEF P. !i 
The Defendant-Appellant cites the case ~ 
-14-
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Lundgreen 112 Utah 31, 184 P.2d 670 (1947) in support of its 
argument of improper distribution. However, as in previous 
cases cited, Lundgreen although somewhat similar, is based on 
specific facts which are not present in the case before the 
court. In Lundgreen, the party claiming the value of its 
labors was also able to establish that it contributed some of 
the costs of the improvements and that it did considerable 
work to aid in improvement of the property to make the house 
liveable. In the current case, the Defendant-Appellant 
never established any such contribution, but raised doubt in 
such regard inasmuch as he traveled widely, was often absent, 
and also used his own funds for gambling purposes. To fund 
construction improvement on less than $240.00 per month in 
addition to financing his other activities would seem very 
unlikely. His testimony as to labor consisted only of general 
yard work and such. 
Another critical element in Lundgreen is that the 
party claiming the value of her contributions established at 
trial that it had entered into an agreement with the other 
party whereby she would furnish the home if the other party 
would purchase it. In the present case there is no evidence 
of such an agreement, in fact the first home was bought and 
paid for some six months prior to the marriage. 
It would seem that the more proper interpretation 
-15-
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of Lundgreen would point to the argument that where a pani 
is unable to establish at trial that it made financial con-
tributions for improvements, or rendered considerable labor 
and time in such improvements, and that the same was done 
pursuant to an agreement related to the original procure-
ment of the property, then the party asserting the interest 
should not be entitled to the Lundgreen award of one-half 
the market value in excess of the purchase price. The 
question then becomes one of "how much less than the Lundgrn: 
award?" The trial court in its discretion apparently chose 
to draw the line at the last home and awarded the Defendant-
Appellant the value of his labors consistent with Lundgreen. 
Finally, in response to the Defendant-Appellant's 
claim that a gift was intended, the record speaks quite clear: 
for itself. The parties were married in their later years of 
life. They both had children and families of their own from 
past marriages. At trial the Plaintiff-Respondent clearly 
stated that she at no time intended to make a one-half gift 
of her life's savings and investments, including the real 
estate to the Defendant-Appellant (Tr. Pll5, LLS-25). She 
did state that he placed considerable pressure upon her to. 
put the property in joint tenancy (Tr. Pll5, LL8-24, Pll6, 
LL6-13). She stated that it had always been her intention 
-16-
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to give the property to her family in the event of her death 
(Tr. Pll6, LLl0-13). The Defendant-Appellant clearly admitted 
that he had no interest in the separate property (See APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF P. 17) 
Although there may be some precedent outside this 
jurisdiction which claims that the placing of property in 
joint tenancy creates a gift of one-half between spouses, the 
testimony referred to above tends to clearly rebut such a 
presumption. Incidentally, there also exists precedent in 
foreign jurisdictions that hold that where title to property 
purchased as a home by a husband was taken in the name of 
himself and his wife as joint tenants, it was held that one 
of the implied conditions of the gift to her was violated 
when, about seven years later she abandoned her husband and 
went to live with another man. See Moore v. Moore 51 App. 
D.C. 304, 278 Fed 1017 (1922). Thus, marital misconduct may 
well affect a gift in joint tenancy, should it be so con-
strued, by one spouse to another. 
There are assuredly numerous theories by which 
division of property in divorce actions could be codified. 
The Plaintiff-Respondent notes that the Defendant-Appellant 
in his brief at trial also presented a "lien theory" and a 
"title theory" for the consideration of the court. The 
Plaintiff-Respondent however points out that this jurisdiction 
-17-
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has neither codified, nor set down any specific rules b h y w 1 
property in divorce actions will be divided by the court 
has not required that the mere designation of property hek 
in "joint tenancy" suddenly creates some magical spousal uni 
of ownership that is beyond the power of the court to award. 
distribute or divide. What the court has said in this regar 
on many different occasions is perhaps most aptly re-stated 
in its opinion in Weaver v. Weaver 21 Utah 2d, 442 P.2d 92i, 
(1968); 
The problem of a division of property between 
parties to divorce proceedings has been before 
this court on numerous occasions. Section 
30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, provides that when a 
decree of divorce is made the court may make 
such orders in relation to the property as 
may be equitable. The decisions of this court 
have not announced a fixed rule or formula 
for the division of property, but the rule 
announced in practically all of the cases is 
to the effect that the trial court has wide 
discretion in these matters and the "ud ment 
o the tria court wi not e distur ed un ess 
the record shows there has been an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the court. (emphasis our:' 
Accordingly, there is no requirement that the trial court 
should have adopted the Defendant-Appellant's theories and 
formulas, and from the trial court's judgment in the matter 
it is clear that all such formulas and theories were rejecte: 
Any findings as to intentions to make or not make gifts, the 
effect of joint holdings, values of labor, funding of improv< 
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of the court. To adopt any set rules, particularly with 
respect to the Defendant-Appellant's gift theory would merely 
further hamstring the courts in the already difficult task of 
dividing property in divorce actions and the Plaintiff-
Respondent urges that the adoption of any such rule be avoided. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully submits that the 
trial court's award of 77% to the Plaintiff-Respondent and 
23% to the Defendant-Appellant of the marital estates was 
proper and clearly within the discretion of the court. The 
Defendant-Appellant has faired to consider the certain factors 
apparently taken into consideration by the trial court and 
has thus based its appeal on assumptions that apparently were 
not sufficiently proven at trial. 
The court properly considered all the factors relat-
ing to the situation of the parties which included evidence 
of marital misconduct which as a practical matter may be used 
in determining the division of property. 
The Plaintiff-Respondent, during her years of marri-
age to the Defendant-Appellant suffered the depletion of her 
entire savings and investments with the exception of one 
mobile home in St. George, Utah. It would only serve to 
double her loss were the Defendant-Appellant, after living 
far above his means at the expense of the Plaintiff-Respondent, 
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and after having contributed very little in return, but exte: 
sive heartache and grief, be able to use the courts to obta'.· 
a substantial portion of the Plaintiff.Respondent's rerna~~ 
property. 
Dated this 10th day of October, 1979. 
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